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NLRB ELECTIONS: AMBUSH OR ANTICLIMAX? 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch* 
The National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) new election procedures 
represent a comprehensive reform of its representation process. As is the case 
for many broad reforms, the new rules have prompted significant criticisms 
and accolades. Many employers have decried the new rules as implementing 
an unfair “ambush” election process that will deprive employees of needed 
information and employers of their right to express their views about 
unionization. In contrast, unions have largely applauded the new rules as an 
improvement on an election system that they view as stacked against them. 
The truth appears far less monumental. Although the NLRB’s new rules 
provide a much-needed update to election procedures and aim to decrease 
many sources of unwarranted delay, they seem incapable of causing a 
significant impact on employees, employers, or unions. The new rules should 
result in a quicker election process, but not so quick that they can be fairly 
described as “ambush” or a deprivation of employers’ ability to communicate 
with employees. Moreover, the modestly shorter time periods for elections are 
unlikely to improve unions’ election win rates or increase union density in a 
significant way. In short, the NLRB has implemented a modest set of 
improvements to its representation process, and critics and proponents should 
not exaggerate the limited impact of those reforms. 
  
 
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Geneva Yeargan Rand Distinguished Professor of Law, 
University of North Carolina School of Law. I thank Isaac Vargas for his research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The basic procedures of the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB or 
Board) election process has been largely stable for decades. That stability, 
however, camouflaged great dissatisfaction with the election process, 
particularly among unions.1 The primary criticism is that parties, especially 
employers, are able to delay elections and unduly coerce employees before 
casting their ballots.2 Many of these problems are out of the NLRB’s hands, as 
they result from statutory or judicial limits.3 But others were well within the 
Board’s control, especially delays involved in holding elections and certifying 
the results, which can substantially reduce employees’ support for a union.4 As 
a result, unions’ perception of the NLRB-election process has deteriorated to 
the point that they have increasingly opted to avoid elections and seek 
voluntary recognition from employers instead.5 
With these problems in mind, the NLRB engaged in a comprehensive 
rulemaking process to revise its election rules in 2011.6 Facing legal hurdles 
 
 1 Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 5–24 
(2008); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of 
Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091, 1125 (2011); Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and 
Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 569, 571 (2007). 
 2 Among the problems are employers’ widespread use of threats, firings, discipline, and harassments 
against union supporters. See Charles J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity 
Under the NLRA and RLA, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 317, 330 (1998) (estimating that one out of eighteen 
employees face unlawful discrimination during campaigns); Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The 
Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing 10–11 tbl.3 (Econ. Policy Inst., Briefing Paper No. 235, 
2009), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/bp235/ (finding discharge of union supporters in 34% of 
surveyed campaigns, threats in 69%, harassment in 41%, and interrogations in 64%).  
 3 For instance, the Board cannot fine parties for unlawful conduct and employers frequently exercise 
their right to use “captive-audience speeches,” in which they force employees to listen to anti-union statements 
because such speeches are effective at reducing support for unions. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 2, at 10 
tbl.3, 13 tbl.4 (finding 89% of employers used, on average, 10.4 captive-audience speeches per campaign and 
unions won only 47% of those campaigns compared to 73% of campaigns without such speeches); see also 
Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation To Address Workplace Captive Audience 
Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209, 214 (2008). 
 4 Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-Contract Campaigns: 
Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 78–79 & 
tbl.5.1 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994) (stating that unions’ rate of success declines from 53% if election 
occurs within 50 days after petition to 41% if election occurs 61–180 days later). Delays in certifying a union 
win can also make it harder to negotiate a contract. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1136 (discussing “first contracts”). 
 5 James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing 
Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 832 (2005); Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1128–29. 
 6 Representation—Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308, 74,311–15 (Dec. 15, 2014) (“On November 
30, 2011, the Board members engaged in public deliberations and a vote about whether to draft and issue a 
final rule, and, on December 22, 2011, a final rule issued.”). Although the NLRB asserted that these procedural 
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based on the possible lack of a quorum during the rulemaking process, the 
Board abandoned the reforms in 2013.7 However, in 2014, the Board—with a 
full complement of members—adopted a new version of election rules.8 
Employers have strongly criticized the election rules, primarily because 
they reduce the amount of time to run and certify an election.9 According to 
these critics, the new “ambush” elections will infringe employers’ free speech 
interests and employees’ right to make an informed choice about 
unionization.10 In contrast, unions have reacted positively, although many 
thought the rules did not go far enough.11 
Employers and unions taking opposing opinions about NLRB action is par 
for the course, but the disagreement raises a question about the rules’ true 
impact. Will they create “ambush” elections that allow unions to secretly 
steamroll employees into a vote for unionization that would not have occurred 
before? Or will they merely paper over other problems with the representation 
process and have little actual impact? Only time will tell, but the rules appear 
to be fairly modest. We should see quicker elections, but not to the degree that 
they can be characterized as “ambush.” Moreover, even with faster elections, it 
seems unlikely that unions’ fortunes will improve dramatically—the hurdles to 
unionization are far too great for improved election procedures to overcome. In 
short, the NLRB is to be commended for eliminating many sources of 
unnecessary delay, but the rules’ critics and supporters seem to be 
exaggerating their effect. 
 
rules were exempt from notice-and-comment requirements, it considered and responded to substantial 
testimony and comments. Id. 
 7 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. of Am. v. NLRB, 879 F. Supp. 2d 18 (2012); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, 
NLRB Voluntarily Dismisses Election Rules Appeals, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Dec. 10, 2013), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2013/12/nlrb-voluntarily-dimisses-election-rules-
appeals.html. 
 8 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308; see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Representation—Case Procedures, 
79 Fed. Reg. 7318, 7318 (Feb. 6, 2014) (noting that 2011 and 2014 rules were very similar). 
 9 See, e.g., Tim Devaney, Biz Groups to Sue Labor Board over “Ambush” Elections, HILL (Jan. 5, 2015, 
11:53 AM EST), http://thehill.com/regulation/228483-businesses-groups-suing-labor-board-over-ambush-
elections. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Timothy Noah, Labor’s Big Comeback, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 2014, 1:29 PM EST), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/labor-comeback-113735.html (describing unions’ description of rules 
as “modest but important”). 
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I. NLRB-ELECTION PROCEDURES 
Although the new election rules represent important changes, at base they 
merely provide a modest update of the Board’s current procedures. NLRB 
elections, which are technically a means to test a “question concerning 
representation,” occur for two primary purposes. The first is the more common 
“initial election,” in which a union seeks to represent a unit of employees. The 
second is a “decertification election,” in which unionized employees vote on 
whether to keep their current union. For both types, the Board will order an 
election only when at least 30% of eligible employees want one.12 
The representation process begins with a party filing an election petition 
with the Board. In most cases, the union and employer enter into a voluntary 
preelection agreement that sets out the procedures for the election, such as 
which employees are eligible to vote and when the vote will occur.13 Although 
the new rules will affect many aspects of these “stipulated elections,” they 
primarily target  “contested elections” in which there is no agreement. 
When there is a contested election petition, the NLRB regional office will 
conduct a hearing to resolve any disputes—such as the 30% threshold and 
eligibility of certain employees—and decide whether to order (or “direct”) an 
election.14 Parties can appeal preelection determinations to the NLRB but 
review is discretionary and rare.15 
After the “direction of election” and resolution of any preelection appeals, 
the employer must provide an “Excelsior list,”16 providing the union with 
contact information for eligible employees. Moreover, the employer must post 
NLRB Notices of Election at the worksite.17 Under the previous rules, there 
was also a mandatory twenty-five day waiting period for the Board to consider 
 
 12 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2014); NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., CASEHANDLING MANUAL, PART TWO: 
REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS § 11023.1 (2007), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/ 
attachments/basic-page/node-1727/chm2.pdf [hereinafter CASEHANDLING MANUAL]. A third type, which is 
essentially an employer-submitted decertification election, requires an employer to demonstrate good-faith 
reasonable uncertainty that a union has majority support. Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 
717 (2001). 
 13 Parties enter into voluntary preelection agreements over 90% of the time. 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,317. 
 14 See infra Part II.D. 
 15 Parties also have seven days to submit a post-hearing brief. Thus, along with the twenty-five day 
period, a party can guarantee at least a thirty-two day delay between a hearing and the actual election. 
Moreover, regions take a median of twenty days to review the hearing transcript and write a decision. 79 Fed. 
Reg. at 74,387. 
 16 See infra Part II.B. 
 17 See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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preelection challenges, despite rarely doing so.18 After that period, the region 
conducts a secret-ballot vote and counts the ballots. Immediately following the 
election, parties may raise further challenges, including allegations of 
misconduct during the campaign, which the region considers in a postelection 
hearing. The previous rules provided parties a right to appeal to the NLRB any 
postelection determinations.19 Once the Board resolves these challenges, it 
either certifies the results or orders a new election. 
The Board’s election reforms are intended to further the NLRA policy of 
resolving representation questions quickly and fairly.20 Critics of the new rules 
argue that elections already occur within a reasonable time frame,21 and for 
most cases—especially uncontested ones—that is not an unreasonable view. 
However, unnecessary delay occurs in all elections22 and the time it takes to 
resolve many representation questions, especially in vigorously contested 
cases, is indefensible.23 
Over the last decade, the median time between the filing of the election 
petition and the actual vote has ranged from about 37–39 days.24 However, 
there are sharp differences between the time to conduct stipulated elections, 
which occur in a median of 36–39 days, and contested elections, which take 
 
 18 The new rules eliminated this period. See infra notes 91–95. 
 19 The new rules made postelection review discretionary. See infra notes 98–103. 
 20 NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 331 (1946) (emphasizing NLRA policy for quick and fair 
resolution of representational questions). 
 21 Representation—Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308, 74,317 (Dec. 15, 2014). 
 22 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 23 For example, in Kansas City Repertory Theatre, Inc., a union was certified 424 days after the filing of 
a representation petition. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., NO. GC-11-09, 
REPORT ON MIDWINTER ABA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE COMMITTEE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 
SECTION 18 (2011). Moreover, in Fiscal Year 2014, almost 12% of representation cases took over 100 days 
after the election petition to close. NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT FY 2014, at 50 (2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-
page/node-1674/13682%20NLRB%202014%20PAR%20v5%20-%20508.pdf [hereinafter PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY]; see also id. at app. C 125  (noting variance of 12.6%–15.6% over previous five years). 
 24 Median Days from Petition to Election, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-
data/petitions-and-elections/median-days-petition-election (last visited May 9, 2015). 
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59–70 days.25 Much of the difference between stipulated and contested 
elections result from the Board’s need to resolve preelection disputes.26 
Delay also occurs after the election. For instance, in Fiscal Year 2012, 
parties filed postelection objections in 55 cases and, although a minority of all 
elections, these cases involved significant delay.27 For the 42 challenges that 
required a hearing, it took regions a median of 73 days to issue a decision; for 
the 13 challenges that did not require a hearing, regions took 43 days.28 Further 
delay occurs when parties exercised their former right to appeal postelection 
determinations to the NLRB, which adds approximately 95–127 days to the 
process.29 Some of this delay is the result of complex issues and the need for 
three Board members to review the case;30 yet, many postelection challenges 
are not substantive and face delay due to the lack of Board resources.31 
Although the NLRB asserted that delay was not the “sole or principal 
purpose” behind its election reforms, a major goal of the Board was clearly to 
reduce the amount of time to run elections, especially the rare cases that take 
an inordinate amount of time.32 But no matter the Board’s central aim, there is 
little doubt that the speed of elections is the principal concern of most 
interested parties. Unions typically want faster elections to reduce employers’ 
opportunity to fight unionization while employers want slower elections for the 
opposite reason.33 
In Part II, I describe some of the major changes that the Board hopes will 
accelerate the representation process, as well as others unrelated to delay. 
Moreover, in Part III, I discuss the fact that the election timetable is relevant 
not only to unions and employers but also to employees’ ability to make a free 
 
 25 In most years, contested elections took 64–67 days. Id. In Fiscal Year 2014, initial elections occurred 
in a median of 38 days, and almost 95.7% of elections occurred within 56 days. PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 23, at 36, 41 (noting that 2,507 petitions were filed to conduct secret ballot 
elections). 
 26 In Fiscal Year 2012, regions took a median of thirty-four days to issue a decision after a preelection 
hearing. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., NO. GC 13-01, SUMMARY OF 
OPERATIONS FY 2012, at 5 (2013) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS FY 2012].  
 27 Id. at 5 (noting that the regions conductions 1,611 initial representation elections). 
 28 Id. 
 29 See 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,332 (NLRB took average of 94.5–127 days over last three years to resolve 
postelection appeals); see also infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 30 See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010). 
 31 See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 32 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,315 (identifying efficiency, fair and accurate voting, transparency and uniformity, 
and use of technology as justifying the need for the rule). 
 33 The parties’ views on delay can be reversed in a decertification election. 
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and informed decision about unionization. I then argue that the Board’s new 
rules provide modest improvements to the representation process that 
adequately balance the interests of all three parties. 
II. THE NEW ELECTION RULES 
The crux of NLRB’s representation proceedings is to ensure that employees 
have a free and fair opportunity to choose whether to seek collective 
representation—a duty that requires the Board to “accurately, efficiently, and 
speedily” determine employees’ votes.34 In its rulemaking, the Board focused 
on improving its ability to hold an accurate and quick vote, while resolving any 
postelection disputes without undue delay. In this Part, I describe some of the 
most prominent ways in which the Board tried to advance these goals. 
A. Electronic Filing 
One of the ways in which the Board tried to reduce delay and inefficiencies 
was to make its procedures less burdensome. For instance, in a long-overdue 
move, the Board will now permit parties to file election documents 
electronically.35 Some commenters argued that small businesses may lack 
access to e-mail and that there may be security issues that could increase 
litigation; however, the Board emphasized that this concern is speculative and 
that many courts and agencies have used with electronic filing with significant 
problems.36 
B. Excelsior List 
In its new rules, the Board attempted to improve the accuracy of the vote 
by giving parties greater access to information, particularly through the 
Excelsior list requirement.37 Under the Board’s 1966 Excelsior Underwear Inc. 
decision, an election order or agreement triggers a requirement that an 
employer provide the union a list of potential voters and their home 
 
 34 NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 331 (1946); see also Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 
479 (1964); 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,316. 
 35 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,478, 74,489 (proposing 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.113, 102.60). Moreover, employers must 
e-mail employees Notices of Election if e-mail is a customary mode of communication at the workplace. Id. at 
74,486 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(k)). 
 36 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,327 (providing the example of spam filters blocking documents). 
 37 Id. at 74,480, 74,486 (proposing 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62, 102.67(l)). 
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addresses.38 One of this rule’s central aims is to ensure that employees had 
adequate time to learn about unionization and make an informed vote.39 
The Board’s new rules now require employers, in addition to the previous 
information, to include the personal e-mail addresses and personal home or 
mobile phone numbers of unit employees, although employers do not have to 
provide work e-mail addresses or work phone numbers.40 This requirement 
extends only to e-mail addresses that employers actually possess; they need not 
seek out contact information from employees. Moreover, the new rules require 
Excelsior lists to include information about unit employees’ work locations, 
shifts, and job classifications—information that will more quickly clarify 
issues about employees’ eligibility to vote.41 
In finalizing its rules, the Board rejected a host of privacy-based objections, 
noting that many of them were merely a rehash of the Excelsior case.42 As for 
the new points of contact, which could increase privacy intrusions, the Board 
concluded—as it had in Excelsior—that the usefulness of that information 
outweighed its costs.43 Indeed, the new information is likely to reduce personal 
intrusions by further encouraging unions’ already declining use of home 
solicitations.44 Further, unwanted e-mail and phone calls are far easier to 
ignore than home visits, especially given the prevalence of spam e-mails and 
solicitation calls.45 This is especially true given that employees have already 
given the new Excelsior information to their employers, and unions can use the 
 
 38 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1240–41 (1966). In NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), the 
Supreme Court approved Excelsior over objections about employee privacy and other concerns.  
 39 The NLRB requires that a union have the Excelsior list for at least ten days before an election, 
although a union can waive that period. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.  
 40 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,480, 74,486 (proposing 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62; 102.67(l)); see also id. at 74,341 
(noting that rule is flexible enough to allow Board to require new forms of communications).  
 41 Id. at 74,480, 74,486 (proposing 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62; 102.67(l)); see also id. at 74,341. Employers 
must also provide this information for individuals in a unit that it argues should replace a proposed unit. See 
infra notes 65–66. 
 42 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,341–42. But see id. at 74,452–55 (dissenting members’ criticizing new rules 
because of privacy concerns and lack of necessity; also arguing for opt-out procedure). 
 43 Id. at 74,342. 
 44 Id. at 74,339, 74,343–44 & n.168, 74,350. 
 45 Id. at 74,343–44; Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Email and the Rip Van Winkle of Agencies: The NLRB’s 
Register-Guard Decision, in WORKPLACE PRIVACY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 58TH 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 185 (Jonathan Remey Nash ed., 2009). 
HIRSCH GALLEYS FLIPS2 5/14/2015  6:35 PM 
1656 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1647 
information only for organizational purposes until the representation 
proceedings are finished.46 
In addition to requiring new information, the Board also shortened the 
Excelsior list deadline from seven calendar days to two business days 
following the election order or agreement.47 Rejecting claims that two days did 
not provide enough time, the Board emphasized improvements in 
recordkeeping, retrieval, and records transmission technology over the decades 
since it decided Excelsior.48 Moreover, even in the requirement’s early years, 
many employers could produce Excelsior lists within two days and virtually all 
did so within four days in order to guarantee that the Board would receive 
them by the seven-day deadline.49 Given current technology and the Board’s 
extensive experience in this area, it is likely that most employers acting in 
good faith will be able to complete the lists within two days. But for the rare 
employer that faces legitimate problems, the region has discretion to extend the 
deadline.50 
The NLRB’s Excelsior reforms reflect the fact that, although not 
universal,51 employee use of e-mail is ubiquitous in many workplaces.52 By 
providing unions more relevant means of communication, especially ones that 
allow quick and regular contact, the rules improve employees’ access to useful 
information and promote the policies underlying Excelsior. 
Although the new Excelsior rules are beneficial, the Board should be 
careful not to exaggerate their effectiveness. For instance, it may be hyperbole 
to suggest, at least in the labor context, that electronic communications are 
becoming more important than face-to-face communications.53 Despite unions’ 
 
 46 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,480, 74,486 (proposing 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62(d), 102.67(l)); see id. 74,344. The 
Board did not specify a remedy for violation of this rule, leaving such determinations to a case-by-case 
analysis, as it currently does. See id. at 74,359. 
 47 Id.  at 74,480, 74,486 (proposing 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62(d), 102.67(l)) (requiring also that employers 
must provide Excelsior list electronically, unless employer is unable to do so). 
 48 Id. at 74,343, 74,351, 74,353. 
 49 Id. at 74,353 (noting that some employers recently were able to produce lists on same day they signed 
election agreements). 
 50 Id. at 74,401 (permitting extension based on extraordinary circumstances or parties’ agreement). 
 51 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, 117 W. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015) (manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2551117. 
 52 79 Fed. Reg. 74,338–39 (citing studies). 
 53 Id. at 74,337 (crediting Justice Kennedy for idea that electronic communications produce most 
significant exchange of ideas in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FTC, 
518 U.S. 727, 802–03 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).  
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increasing reliance on electronic communications,54 face-to-face 
communications are typically the most effective means to convince employees 
to vote for a union.55 This fact does not undermine the justification for the new 
rules, but it should remind the Board and courts that in-person communications 
remain critically important in other circumstances.56 
Finally, one curious aspect of the new Excelsior requirement is the 
exclusion of work e-mail addresses. Although the NLRB may have been 
accommodating employers’ proprietary claims to such information, the 
dissenting Board members have a point in noting that the exclusion of work 
e-mail seems to contradict the Board’s recent recognition of employees’ 
limited right to use company e-mail.57 
C. Preelection Challenges 
Among the greatest sources of delay in the NLRB-representation process is 
the handling of election disputes. Both before and after an election, parties can 
raise challenges that often significantly delay the scheduling of an election or 
certification of the results. For example, parties can challenge the election’s 
details, such as the identity of eligible voters, as well as the decision to hold an 
election at all. Regions first consider these issues in preelection hearings to 
determine whether a genuine “question concerning representation” exists—that 
is, whether there is a proper petition involving an appropriate bargaining unit 
with the requisite 30% employee support.58 If a region determines that such a 
question exists, it will order an election to answer it. In its new rules, the Board 
made changes to the timing of preelection challenges, as well as their 
substance.59 
 
 54 Id. at 74, 350; see also id. at 74,337 (citing cases). 
 55 Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1108–09. 
 56 For instance, the Supreme Court and the Board have dramatically reduced unions’ ability to 
communicate with employees at a worksite. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533, 541 (1992) 
(allowing employers to bar nonemployees except in discriminatory fashion or if no other means of access); 
Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1117–18 (2007) (adopting narrow discrimination 
exception), overruled in part on other grounds by Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 2014 WL 
6989135 (Dec. 11, 2014). As I have urged elsewhere, the Board should encourage more in-person 
communications by adopting a broader definition of discrimination, which it may do. Hirsch, supra note 45, at 
204–09; see also Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, Roundy’s Inc., NLRB Case No. 30-CA-17185 (Nov. 12, 
2010), http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3253/roundys_notice_and_ 
invitation.pdf (inviting briefs on whether to change Register-Guard discrimination rule). 
 57 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,452 (citing Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126). 
 58 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2014). 
 59 Postelection challenges are discussed below in Part II.E. 
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One timing change is a new deadline requiring hearings within eight 
calendar days following the service of a Notice of Hearing, which was already 
a practice in some regions.60 The Board chose to adopt this policy nationwide 
as a means to quicken elections without imposing burdens on parties.61 
Moreover, the rules codified previous practice by not allowing parties to 
file post-hearing briefs without regions’ permission.62 However, parties are 
entitled to a “reasonable period” of time to make oral arguments at the end of 
preelection hearings.63 
In addition to these timing issues, the new election rules made several 
substantive changes to the preelection dispute process. One set of reforms 
involves the “Statement of Position” form, which gives parties a means to 
identify issues they may raise in a preelection hearing. The new rules now 
require a non-petitioning party (employers in initial elections or unions in 
decertification elections) to submit their Statement of Position one day before 
the preelection hearing.64 The Board also codified some regions’ practice of 
requiring parties to state in their forms any challenges they intend to raise, 
including an objection to the appropriateness of proposed unit.65 If a party 
proposes adding employees to the unit, the Statement of Position must list 
those employees and their Excelsior job characteristics.66 Petitioning parties, in 
turn, must respond to these issues at the start of the hearing.67 These new 
 
 60 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,470 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.63) (excluding federal holidays; exempting cases 
with “unusually complex issues”; and permitting two additional days based on “special circumstances” and 
two more days based on “extraordinary circumstances”). Parties must file a Statement of Position one day 
before the hearing, although those forms may be amended for good cause. Id. at 74,473. But see id. at 74,444 
(dissenting members criticizing good cause standard as too strict). 
 61 Id. at 74,370 (citing Croft Metals, Inc., 337 N.L.R.B. 688, 688 (2002)) (noting that previous policy 
guaranteed parties only five business days’ notice before a hearing). 
 62 Id. at 74,484 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(h)); see also id. at 74,401–03 (rejecting call for fourteen-
day maximum time to submit briefs). 
 63 Id. at 74,484 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(h)). 
 64 Id. at 74,481–82 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.63(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3)); see also id. at 74,362–64 
(arguing that one-day rule will help spur negotiations and narrow the scope of preelection hearings and noting 
that the time frame is similar to current practices). The Statement of Position should also include parties’ 
preference for the date, time, and location of the election. Id. at 74,481–82 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.62(g)). 
 65 Id. at 74,481–82 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.63(b)(1)(i), (2)(i), (3)(i)) (requiring statement of why unit 
is inappropriate and list of classifications, locations, or employees to add or exclude to make unit appropriate); 
see also id. at 74,365–69 (explaining the Board’s rationale for incorporating these requirements). 
 66 Id. at 74,481–82 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.63(b)(1), (2), (3)); see also id. at 74,361–62 (explaining 
the elements of the new rule); supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 67 Id. at 74,483–84 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(b)). 
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requirements have teeth because the failure to raise issues in the Statement of 
Position will typically constitute a waiver.68 
The new rules also sought to streamline preelection hearings. One of the 
main new policies limits the scope of preelection hearings by tabling most 
challenges to individuals’ eligibility to vote until postelection proceedings.69 In 
its proposed rules, the Board had planned to codify a common regional practice 
by allowing preelection consideration of eligibility questions only if they 
implicated at least 20% of a proposed unit.70 Citing the need for flexibility, the 
Board ultimately declined to mandate the 20% threshold, although it noted its 
expectation that regions will continue to use the threshold in most preelection 
hearings.71 This represents a sensible middle ground between commentators 
who wanted the Board either to codify or to abandon the 20% threshold.72 
When a region does not believe that individual eligibility issues will be 
dispositive, it makes sense to run the election and consider those issues later, if 
at all.73 
The new rules also limited parties’ ability to introduce evidence at a 
preelection hearing. Previously, parties could introduce evidence about any 
issue, even if it was not relevant to the hearing.74 Now, only “evidence of the 
significant facts that support the party’s contentions and are relevant to the 
existence of a question of representation” is allowed.75 This rule, in addition to 
the Statement of Position waiver,76 will streamline the preelection hearing 
process and reduce delay. It is true, as the Board conceded, that hearing 
 
 68 Id. (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(b), (d)). A region can permit an amendment of the form “in a timely 
manner for good cause.” Id. at 74,481–82 (29 C.F.R. § 102.63(b)(1), (2), (3)); see also id. at 74,398–40 
(discussing comments noting that regions can still take evidence on Board jurisdiction and unit 
appropriateness). 
 69 Id. at 74,482 (29 C.F.R. § 102.64(a)). Eligibility may turn on issues such as individuals’ classification 
as an “employee” or inclusion in the petitioned-for bargaining unit. 
 70 Id. at 74,383–84, 74,403–04 (discussing proposed 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(d)); see also id. at 74,485 
(proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b)) (requiring region, if deferring individual eligibility questions, to state in 
Notice of Election that such individuals are not necessarily included or excluded in unit). 
 71 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,387–88 & n.373 (noting also that, in Fiscal Year 2013, over 70% of elections were 
decided by margin greater than 20%). But see id. at 74,445–46 (dissenting members arguing that 20% 
guideline is too strict given preelection uncertainties).  
 72 Id. at 74,387–89. 
 73 Id. at 74,413. But see id. at 74,430 (dissenting members criticizing “election now, hearing later” and 
“vote now, understand later” rules). 
 74 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(a) (2014); Barre-Nat’l, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 877 (1995). 
 75 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,483 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(a)); see also id. at 74,384 (noting that standard 
is borrowed from FED. R. CIV. P. 56).  
 76 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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officers occasionally may face difficult questions about the relevancy of 
certain evidence but they will be guided by the regions’ extensive experience 
deferring questions of individuals’ eligibility to a postelection hearing.77 
Finally, the Board altered the preelection appeals process. For instance, 
under the previous policy, parties had to request NLRB review of a region’s 
direction of election within fourteen days.78 The Board initially proposed to 
eliminate these preelection appeals and consolidate remaining issues with any 
postelection challenges.79 This was a sensible proposal that reflected the 
time-consuming nature of NLRB review and the fact that many preelection 
disputes are eventually mooted by the election or resolved by the parties.80 
However, bowing to an argument that Section 3(b)81 of the NLRA gives parties 
a right to interlocutory review, the final rules maintain parties’ ability to seek 
Board review of an election order at any time.82 But a request for review will 
not stay the election in most circumstances nor will it result in the impounding 
of ballots, as used to be the case.83 Although the Board could have been more 
aggressive, eliminating the need to file preelection appeals and the impounding 
of ballots should streamline the representation process and decrease parties’ 
incentive to delay the release of election results through preelection 
challenges.84 
D. Scheduling the Election 
In addition to altering some of the procedures that can delay the election 
process, the Board’s new rules also directly addressed the scheduling of 
elections. As it did in other areas, the Board appears to have taken a moderate 
path in which it eliminated some areas of delay but not all. 
One issue under consideration was the policy that permits a party entitled to 
an Excelsior list to waive part of the ten day period normally required between 
 
 77 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,384 (citing, inter alia, Allegany Aggregates, Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 658 (1999)). 
 78 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b), (f) (2014). Failure to meet this requirement resulted in the waiver of the issue. 
A.S. Horner, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 393, 395 (1979). 
 79 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,407. 
 80 Id. 
 81 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2012) (“[U]pon the filing of a request therefor with the Board by any interested 
person, the Board may review any action of a regional director delegated to him under this paragraph . . . .”). 
 82 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,485 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c)); see also id. at 74,407 (concluding that 
Section 3(b) does not guarantee interlocutory review but preserves it). 
 83 Id. at 74,485 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c)). Like Section 3(b), this rule allows the Board to grant a 
stay, which it emphasized that it will continue to do “very rarely.” Id. at 74,409. 
 84 Id. at 74,408–09. 
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the list’s deadline and the election.85 Employers argued that the waiver option 
undermined their ability to opine about the union and reduced employees’ 
exposure to information.86 But the Board disagreed, noting that unions will 
only use the waiver when they are “confident that employees have heard [their] 
message,” and that, even with a waiver, employers have abundant access to 
employees.87 The Board also considered, but decided against, shortening the 
three-working-day period that employers must post a Notice of Election, which 
provides employees information about the election.88 
When a region directs an election, the new rules state that “ordinarily” the 
order will include election details such as the date, time, location, and type of 
election.89 This change is intended to avoid delays caused by the fact that an 
election order used to merely start discussions about the details. However, the 
Board resisted calls for a maximum or minimum time period before an election 
and, instead, maintained flexibility by codifying its policy of scheduling the 
election at the “earliest date practicable.”90 
The Board’s most significant change was to eliminate the requirement that 
contested elections must incorporate an automatic delay of least twenty-five 
days after the direction of election.91 The ostensible purpose of this waiting 
period was to allow the Board to act on any requests for review, which were 
uncommon.92 Moreover, the Board rarely granted review and, even when it 
did, it almost never stayed the election.93 Thus, this rule did little more than 
guarantee almost a month’s delay in every contested election.94 Indeed, the 
 
 85 See Mod Interiors, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 164 (1997); CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, § 11302.1. 
 86 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,361. 
 87 Id.; see also id. at 74,360 (noting also that goal of waiting period is to provide nonemployers access to 
employees). 
 88 See 29 C.F.R. § 103.20(a) (2014); see 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,485 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b)) 
(requiring electronic posting if e-mail is common mode of communication at workplace); id. at 74,486 
(preserving three business day rule); see also id. at 77,406, 77,442 (rejecting two-day proposal because it 
abandoned a different proposal that regions electronically send notices to employees); CASEHANDLING 
MANUAL, supra note 12, § 11302.11. 
 89 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,485 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b)). This rule is aided by the new expectation 
that parties’ Statements of Position and responses should include their preferences about election details. See 
supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 90 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,485 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b)); see also id. at 74,409–10; CASEHANDLING 
MANUAL, supra note 12, § 11302.11. 
 91 See 29 C.F.R. § 101.21(d) (2014); 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,410. 
 92 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,410 & n.456 (citing annual reports). 
 93 Id. at 74,410. 
 94 Id. (noting that policy also delayed stipulated elections by changing negotiating positions and 
conflicted with Section 3(b)’s default against staying regions’ decisions). 
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twenty-five day waiting period made so little sense that, even though its 
elimination could significantly reduce the time it takes to run elections, there 
were few objections to the new rule.95 
E. Election Disputes 
In addition to preelection disputes, the Board’s new rules also addressed 
delay associated with the postelection period. A prime example is the policy 
that permitted regions to transfer a case to the Board at any time.96 Although 
transfers were infrequent, they result in such significant delays that the Board 
eliminated them.97 
A related reform is that NLRB review of postelection disputes will no 
longer be a matter of right. Instead, as has been the case for preelection 
disputes,98 the Board will now have discretion whether to review regions’ 
postelection decisions.99 
The move to discretionary review reflected the inefficiencies in the Board’s 
postelection review process. For instance, in Fiscal Year 2013, parties sought 
Board review of regions’ postelections decisions only in around one-third of 
cases and, of those, the Board reversed about 10%.100 Moreover, according to 
the Board, many requests for review are focused on narrow factual issues or 
formulaic claims of error that do not come close to overcoming the substantial 
deference given to regions.101 Thus, limiting Board review to cases involving 
more substantive claims helps the agency conserve resources and more 
efficiently administer the representation process.102 Although some 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(h), (i), (j) (2014). 
 97 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,403 (listing cases). 
 98 Id. at 74,331. 
 99 Id. at 74,485–86 (proposing 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62(b), 102.67); see also id. at 74,479. The Board 
codified the current practice of regions’ determining whether substantial and material factual issues that 
warrant a postelection hearing, which should occur in twenty-one days. Id. at 74,487 (proposing 29 C.F.R. 
§ 102.69(c)(1)(ii)) (allowing extension to “as soon as practicable”); see also id. at 74,414–16 (discussing 
decision not to decrease period to fourteen days). Following the hearing, a hearing officer issues 
recommendations and parties have fourteen days to file exceptions with the regional director, who issues a 
decision. Id. at 74,487 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(c)(1)(iii)). 
 100 Id. at 74,332 n.106 (noting that parties appealed one-third of ninety-eight “post-election decisions 
concerning objections or determinative challenges,” and the Board reversed three of them). 
 101 Id. at 74,332 (citing Stretch-Tex Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1359, 1361 (1957)). 
 102 Id. at 74,485 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c)) (allowing review based on, for example, substantial 
legal or policy questions, clearly erroneous decisions of substantial factual issues that prejudiced a party, 
HIRSCH GALLEYS FLIPS2 5/14/2015  6:35 PM 
2015] NLRB ELECTIONS 1663 
commentators objected to the Board “abdicating” its responsibilities,103 the 
new rule is justified by its ability to save time while maintaining Board review 
of substantive challenges. 
Finally, the Board maintained its current time period for filing objections to 
an election, which is seven days after the tally of votes.104 However, the Board 
eliminated the additional seven days that parties previously had to file evidence 
supporting their postelection objections; in most cases, that evidence should 
now be part of the offer of proof submitted along with objections.105 Given that 
there was little evidence that parties needed this additional seven-day period, 
its elimination is a reasonable reform that reduces parties’ ability to delay the 
resolution of elections. 
F. Blocking Charge Policy 
One problematic issue that the Board considered but left undisturbed was 
its “blocking charge” policy.106 Under this policy, the Board will generally stay 
an election if there is a pending unfair labor practice charge involving conduct 
that would interfere with employees’ vote.107 
The purpose of the blocking charge policy is to remedy any unlawful 
conduct so that it does not prevent a fair election.108 However, it also provides 
the party opposed to an election the incentive to file unfair labor practice 
charges and delay the vote. This tactic is available in all elections, but in 
practice it is primarily a tool of unions facing a decertification vote.109 The 
Board is well aware of this incentive and can choose not block an election, but 
 
hearing conduct that prejudiced a party, or compelling reasons to reconsider important NLRB rules or 
policies). 
 103 Id. at 74,332–33. Moreover, parties can still raise issues in technical Section 8(a)(5) proceedings. 
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(d) (2012); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964) (permitting judicial 
review of employer’s refusal to bargain with union based on disagreement with Board election decision). That 
said, unfair labor practice adjudication and judicial review is more time consuming than the typical Board 
representation process. 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,450–51 (dissenting members’ criticism on postelection review rule). 
 104 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (2014). 
 105 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,486 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 102.69); see also id. at 74,411–12 (explaining rationale 
for permitting extension of time for good cause). 
 106 Id. at 74,418–20 (explaining decision not to change policy). 
 107 CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, § 11730. 
 108 See 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,418–20. 
 109 Zev J. Eigen & Sandro Garofalo, Less Is More: A Case for Structural Reform of the National Labor 
Relations Board, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1879, 1896 (2014); Joan Flynn, Allentown Mack and Economic Strikes: 
And Now for the Bad News, 49 LAB. L.J. 1205 (1998). 
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many observers—particularly employers—believe the Board has not exercised 
its discretion enough.110 
Although few challenge the idea that the Board should prevent serious 
unlawful conduct from interfering with an election,111 some reform is 
warranted. In particular, many critics have argued that unions have been able 
to abuse the blocking charge policy by using less serious charges to delay an 
election—and they have a point.112 Despite the fact that the Board puts 
blocking charge cases under its highest priority,113 the delays involved are 
often significant.114 The Board’s new rules indirectly affected the blocking 
charge policy by requiring parties to file an offer of proof to support a request 
for a stay,115 but that requirement is unlikely to change much, if anything. 
Instead, the Board should have explored new rules such as lowering the 
presumption that favors staying elections in most circumstances or setting a 
cap on the length of stays, either of which might have satisfied the blocking 
charge policy’s main purpose while reducing abuse.116 
III. PRACTICAL EFFECTS AND EMPLOYEE INFORMATION 
The primary focus of both proponents and opponents of the new election 
rules is the amount of time it takes to hold and certify elections. Delay is 
generally crippling to unions, which find their support decreasing as employers 
fight organizing efforts and time passes without any collective bargaining.117 
Employers often welcome delay for the same reasons, although some may 
prefer not to be caught up in a prolonged campaign and litigation. 
 
 110 See 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,419; CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 11730, 11731 (listing 
exceptions). 
 111 See, e.g., 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,455–56 (dissenting members arguing for stays only when alleged unlawful 
conduct both interferes with employee free choice and taints a representation petition, such as employers’ 
unlawful assisting decertification petition). 
 112 See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations Act Without 
Statutory Change, 5 FIU L. REV. 361, 369 tbl.2 (2010) (noting that in 2008, elections in blocking charge cases 
took median of 139 days compared to 38 days in unblocked elections).  
 113 CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, § 11740.1. 
 114 See supra note 112. 
 115 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,490 (proposing 29 C.F.R. § 103.20); see also id. at 74,419–20 (noting that regions 
will now have information, such as identification of witnesses, to more quickly decide whether to issue stay). 
 116 Eigen & Garofalo, supra note 109, at 1897 (proposing fourteen-day maximum). The Board rejected 
calls to eliminate or narrow its presumption in favor of a stay when there is evidence of most types of unlawful 
conduct. 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,420.  
 117 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. The converse is true for unions facing decertification 
elections. 
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For the NLRB, which has the duty to safeguard employees’ ability to make 
a free choice, reducing delay justifiably took a central role.118 However, there 
is a countervailing concern that running elections too quickly could prevent 
employees from receiving balanced information about unionization. In other 
words, if these were really “ambush” elections and do not leave enough time 
for employees to hear from their employer, they may have an unduly positive 
view of unions.119 This is a far less significant concern than excessive delay,120 
but it is still an important factor that the Board appropriately considered when 
shaping its election rules. 
Many employers commented to the Board that a quicker election schedule 
inhibits employers’ ability to express their views and therefore prevents 
employees from making an informed choice.121 In truth, most employers are 
probably more concerned with avoiding unionization than protecting 
employees’ rights. Yet, regardless of employers’ motivation, the issue is a 
valid one. The election system already fails to expose employees to many types 
of useful information because it relies primarily on two self-interested 
parties.122 If the new election process moves too fast, it could exacerbate this 
problem by further limiting access exposure to information. But what is too 
fast? 
Given the variability in elections, there is no way to determine an ideal time 
period. The NLRB election process often takes far too long, but there are 
examples of election systems that may run too quickly. For instance, in some 
 
 118 See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. Even the dissenting Board members expressed a desire to 
reduce delay, advocating a rule with a minimum of 30–35 days and maximum of 60 days for all elections, 
absent special circumstances. 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,459. 
 119 But see 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,430 (dissenting members arguing that fast elections gives employees less 
time to understand important issues); Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Limiting Information in the Information Age: 
The NLRB’s Misguided Attempt to Squelch Employer Speech, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 473, 485–506 (2013) 
(criticizing quicker elections for limiting speech and also proposing alternatives). 
 120 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 121 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,318. Moreover, although employers complained that unions try to keep their 
organizing efforts secret, in the vast majority of cases employers are well aware of campaigns long before 
there is an election petition. Id. at 74,320–21; NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 620 (1969) (noting 
that unions normally tell employers about campaigns to establish possible unfair labor practice charges and 
election objections); Kate Bronfenbrenner & Dorian Warren, The Empirical Case for Streamlining the NLRB 
Certification Process 3 tbl.1, 4 (Inst. for Social & Econ. Research & Policy, Working Paper 2011.01, 2011), 
available at http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/working_paper_cover_2011-01-final.pdf (finding 
that 47% of serious allegations of unlawful conduct settled or found meritorious involved pre-petition 
employer conduct, and over 50% of other allegations involved pre-petition conduct). 
 122 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,438–41 (dissenting members discussing need for employers to inform employees); 
Bodie, supra note 1, at 35–38 (describing information lacking in current system); Hirsch, supra note 1, at 
1124–25 (discussing importance of information to employees’ vote). 
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Canadian provinces elections are required to occur in as few as five days.123 
This time period is so short that there is a genuine risk that employees will not 
get necessary information, especially given that some employees might be out 
sick or on vacation during the brief campaign period.124 Nevertheless, although 
too little time can be problematic, more is not always better. Because of the 
risk of coercion, the NLRB-election process is a rare instance in which less 
communication can enhance, rather than hinder, employees’ right to freely 
choose whether to unionize.125 The question is whether the Board’s new 
system falls within a justifiable middle ground. 
The answer to this inquiry hinges on how the new election system will 
operate in practice. Some commentators claimed that the elections will now 
occur in as little as eight days after a petition, but that does not appear 
possible.126 At a minimum, a region will schedule a hearing eight days after a 
petition,127 take at least one day to conduct the hearing, then spend an 
unspecified amount of time to consider the evidence and write a decision.128 If 
the region orders an election, then an employer must post the Notice of 
Election for at least three days prior to the election.129 In other words, even if a 
region works as fast as possible, there are at least eleven days of delay. 
 
 123 See Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C., c. 244, s. 24(2) (Can.) (providing ten days in British Columbia); 
Labor Relations Act, C.C.S.M., c. L10, s. 48(3) (Can.) (providing seven days in Manitoba); Labour Relations 
Act, R.S.N.L., c. L-1, s. 47(4) (Can.) (providing five business days in Newfoundland and Labrador); Trade 
Union Act, R.S.N.S., c. 475, s. 25(3) (Can.) (providing five working days in Nova Scotia); Labour Relations 
Act, S.O., c. 1, s. 8(5) (Can.) (providing five business days in Ontario). In reality, the elections usually take 
longer. See Michele Campolieti, Chris Riddell & Sara Slinn, Labor Law Reform and the Role of Delay in 
Union Organizing: Empirical Evidence from Canada, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 32, 50 tbl.11, 51 (2007) 
(noting that Ontario took an average of 50.6 days from 1995–1998, and British Columbia an average of 23.8 
days from 1987–1992). 
 124 Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1136–37. 
 125 Id. 
 126 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,324. Theoretically, uncontested elections could occur that quickly if the region 
moved extremely fast. However, that possibility also existed under the previous rules. Id.  
 127 Id. at 74,309 (noting that former regional best practice was 7–10 days, although some regions took 
15 days or longer). 
 128 Id. at 74,324. After the hearing, the hearing officer makes an initial set of rulings, which the regional 
director then reviews before determining whether a question concerning representation exists. See id. at 74,483 
(proposed 29 C.F.R. § 102.65(c)). In Fiscal Year 2012, regions took a median of thirty-four days to issue 
preelection decisions, see supra note 26, and the Board cited a multiyear median of twenty days. 79 Fed. Reg. 
at 74,332. The default date to schedule an election is at least ten days after the Excelsior list is due, which is 
two days after the petition; however, a union can waive the ten-day period. See supra notes 85–88 and 
accompanying text. 
 129 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,483 (proposed 29 C.F.R. § 102.65(c)). 
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Although eleven days represents the minimum time required to run an 
election, actual practice will almost certainly be significantly longer, especially 
given that regions typically take weeks to issue preelection decisions.130 
Moreover, as regions schedule elections “for the earliest day practicable,”131 
they will take into account the time it takes to conduct a fair election with 
well-informed employees.132 Indeed, in recent years, regions have taken an 
average of 36–39 days to conduct even uncontested elections. Now-eliminated 
delays may have influenced these averages by altering parties’ negotiating 
positions,133 but it is difficult to believe that regions will schedule contested 
elections substantially faster than they currently schedule uncontested 
elections. Speculation about the speed of future elections is inherently 
unreliable, especially given the Board refusal to set or suggest minimum and 
maximum time limits.134 However, the basic resources and considerations 
involved with most elections lead me to predict that the median time to run 
contested elections will roughly track the current uncontested election 
schedule. 
If this prediction is close to accurate, it appears that the new election 
system falls well within the middle ground between unreasonably slow and 
unjustifiably fast.135 The rules will reduce some of the delay that has interfered 
with employees’ rights in the past, yet still provides sufficient opportunity for 
parties to express their views.136 The real question is whether the shortened 
election timeline will actually make a meaningful reduction in 
campaign-related coercion. The new rules are likely to help some, but their 
impact is severely limited by the Board’s weak enforcement and remedial 
authority.137 
 
 130 See supra note 128. 
 131 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,485 (proposed 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b)). 
 132 Id. at 74,405. 
 133 Id. at 74,387 (noting that parties could always force automatic twenty-five day waiting period and 
seven-day period to file post-hearing brief). 
 134 See id. at 74,323–24 (preferring to leave decision to schedule election up to the General Counsel to 
decide on case-by-case basis). 
 135 Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1137 (arguing that minimum time necessary to provide employees with 
sufficient exposure to both union and employer views could be as little as fourteen days). 
 136 Some argued that the shortened time period infringed employers’ statutory and constitutional right to 
express their views. 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,432 (dissenting members advocating this position). However, 
Section 8(c)’s protection for employers’ nonthreatening speech does not apply to representation proceedings. 
See id. at 74,318 (citing cases). Moreover, the First Amendment is not implicated because employers are still 
free to express their views—they just have less time to do so. Id. at 74,319, 74,321–23. 
 137 Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1126 n.185 (discussing enforcement problems). Even the dissenting NLRB 
members sought more emphasis on enforcement and remedies. 79 Fed. Reg. at 74,459. 
HIRSCH GALLEYS FLIPS2 5/14/2015  6:35 PM 
1668 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1647 
Finally, although the Board rightly focused on process, most parties are 
primarily concerned with results: that is, whether unions will win more 
elections. It is too early to tell what impact the rules will have on election 
results, especially without knowing how quickly elections will occur in 
practice. One would expect some improvement in unions’ success,138 but I 
suspect that it will not be dramatic. The forces working against unionization, 
such as global economic pressures and employers’ ability to aggressively fight 
unions, still persist.139 Thus, while the new rules are undoubtedly a positive 
step for unions, the changes are modest and unlikely to result in extensive 
gains. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay asks whether the new election rules are “ambush” or anticlimax; 
the answer is neither. The changes are exceedingly modest and could be 
criticized for not doing enough. However, they are not inconsequential. The 
Board’s reforms should lead to somewhat quicker elections and fewer cases in 
which employees’ freedom to vote is frustrated—all while maintaining 
employees’ access to information. 
No major NLRB initiative can avoid partisan wrangling, and these rules are 
no different. Yet, the Board managed to promulgate a measured set of reforms 
upholding ideals that even employers have purported to support.140 
Disagreement, and no doubt litigation, will continue to surround the new 
election rules, but they deserve recognition for what they are: modest and 
reasonable procedural reforms. 
 
 
 138 In Canada, for instance, speeding up the representation and unfair labor practice processes increased 
the chance of union certification. See Brudney, supra note 5, at 880 n.297; Campolieti et al., supra note 123, at 
33–34. 
 139 Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1136 n.242. 
 140 During the debate over the Employee Free Choice Act’s card-check provisions, employers frequently 
extoled the indispensability of secret-ballot elections. Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill To 
Assist Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/business/ 
17union.html. 
